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Terrorism is a crime that traditional theories of criminal justice oft en cannot explain. Establishing 
punishment for criminal actions is typically a means to deterrence, incapacitation, or a combination 
of these principles. Th rough deterrence, the penalty for a crime must be such that it outweighs any 
estimated gain to the potential criminal, so that he does not attempt the crime. Incapacitation is founded 
on the notion of precluding crime without appealing to the rational calculation of the individual. 
Incapacitation is an expensive endeavor, and deterrence is generally a more cost-eff ective way to combat 
crime. Each of these theories usually plays a role in setting criminal punishment, but due to the unique 
nature of terrorism, it is not clear that either is a valid response. First, I consider how deterrence works and 
whether it is even an option when dealing with terrorism. Second, I examine how deterrence or alternate 
enforcement measures can be administered. Finally, I analyze how early sanctions may be imposed 
before the actual commission of a terrorist attack, and how this diff ers from sanctions for other crimes.
In order to understand the effi  cacy of deterrence, one must assume the mindset of the person 
about to commit the crime. In other words, proper deterrence demands an accurate understanding of 
the criminal’s potential payoff  as well as his chances of success versus failure. If the individual estimates 
that he will gain $1,000,000 by committing the act, then the sanction against the act multiplied by the 
probability of detection must have a perceived value greater than or equal to $1,000,000 in the mind of 
the potential criminal. It is assumed that this individual will examine the likelihood that he will be caught, 
calculate the expected penalty, and thereby conclude that he will not benefi t from committing the crime. 
One method of determining the appropriate punishment or enforcement against a crime 
is through a utilitarian calculation of costs and benefi ts. Steven Shavell presents a theory on 
establishing sanctions so as to maximize social welfare. He recognizes that deterrence is dependent 
on the psychology of the criminal actor and off ers a corresponding explanation for devising the 
probability and magnitude of sanctions. He notes that, to a risk-averse individual, increasing the 
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magnitude of sanctions for a crime will have a more substantial deterrent eff ect than increasing the 
probability of sanctions to the same degree (Shavell 479-480). In the case of terrorism, I believe 
that an individual prepared to commit an act of terror is only sensitive to the risk of being caught 
before commission of the act and completely insensitive to the risk of being punished ex post facto, 
no matter how severe the sanction. Th e primary objective of the terrorist is to infl ict a great deal of 
damage, and self-interested sentiments are only secondarily important. Th erefore, the likelihood of 
early detection is the most important concern to a terrorist who is deciding when, where and how 
to commit his crime. Setting high punishments for terror would have little if any deterrent eff ect. 
Th e appropriate enforcement mechanism against terrorism must focus heavily on increasing the 
probability of detection before the act and disregard an increase in the magnitude of sanctions. 
Increasing the probability of detection likely means increasing expenditure on law enforcement 
personnel and equipment. Unfortunately, this option entails a higher cost and does not guarantee that 
the terrorist will not strike in another area, but should ultimately be more eff ective in reducing harm.
Deterrence theory in criminal law consists of using incentives and disincentives to dissuade crime. 
In a study of terrorism through law and economics, Nuno Garoupa, Jonathan Klick and Francesco Parisi 
point out that much governmental policy towards the IRA and ETA, two prominent organizations that 
have committed acts of terror, presupposes that terrorists do care about the magnitude of punishment 
(2). Simply because government policy believes that the magnitude of punishment is important, 
however, does not mean that it is in fact the case. If a terrorist cares even a little about the magnitude of 
sanctions he would face if apprehended, then deterrence can have a role in enforcement against terror. 
A rational calculation of the expected punishment of terrorism would multiply the probability of 
detection by the consideration given to the weight of punishment. But if a terrorist gives zero weight 
to the magnitude of sanctions because he does not care about being punished, then the product of the 
magnitude and probability of sanctions equals zero in terms of the deterrent eff ect. In this calculation, the 
terrorist is not risk-neutral but risk-ignorant and the anti-terror eff ort to deter the terrorist is ineff ective.
Another facet of deterrence theory involves the use of marginal deterrence to impose greater 
sanctions when the likelihood or magnitude of harm is amplifi ed. Shavell explains that marginal 
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deterrence can dissuade a more harmful act when the individual is examining diff erent courses of 
action (518-519). Just as with ordinary deterrence, marginal deterrence assumes that the prospective 
criminal considers the possibility that he will face some degree of sanctions. As previously noted, this 
may or may not be the case for terrorism. Marginal deterrence also requires that the penalty for an 
attempted crime be much less severe than for a completed crime (Garoupa, Klick and Parisi 16). Th is 
method is meant to promote an individual’s reconsideration of the crime before completion, but it 
may have the adverse eff ect of reducing the magnitude of the expected sanction against a terrorist 
attack. Of course, fear of this adverse eff ect assumes that terrorists are responsive to the magnitude 
of sanctions, but that must be presupposed if marginal deterrence is to have any effi  cacy at all.
It is diffi  cult to generalize regarding terrorists and their motivations before the commission of 
a terrorist attack. It is likely that certain terrorists are responsive to potential sanctions while others 
are not. In the specifi c case of a suicide bomber, the terrorist is impervious to personal punishment 
because he brings the highest form of criminal punishment upon himself. Th is ultimate sacrifi ce is 
an indication that no sanction exists that is suffi  cient to deter completion of such a mission, which 
has value greater than the life of the individual. Th is feature of terrorism makes it diffi  cult to identify 
incentives and disincentives that could be used in infl uencing the decision of a terrorist before he 
acts. Generally, a suicide bomber maintains a religious belief that he will be rewarded as a martyr 
in the aft erlife, and religious convictions are nearly impossible to reason against. A closer study of 
diff erent terrorist groups may provide more insight into the calculations made by each organization 
and hence the motivations aff ecting the individuals therein. To reiterate, an understanding of the 
unusual psychology of the terrorist is crucial to determining the best course of action against him.
Another potential problem with direct deterrence of the terrorist lies with the defi ant response 
that legal sanctions elicit. Braithwaite explains the psychological principle that an escalation in the 
threat of sanctions produces increased deterrence but also increased defi ance. He notes that deterrence 
is the prominent response when the sanction threatens a freedom that is not so critical to the subject, 
but that defi ance is stronger when the sanction impinges upon a freedom of action that is desperately 
desired (Braithwaite 4-5). Many terrorist acts are motivated by fundamental political beliefs. ETA is 
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committed to fi ghting for Basque independence from Spain, the IRA engaged in violent acts in the name 
of defending Catholic Irish nationalist interests, and al-Qaeda is driven to attack Western infl uence in 
the Muslim world. Potential terrorists from these groups and others are wholly committed to the cause 
and have been known to react with defi ance to any attempt to deter them. Braithwaite further explains 
that fundamentalist fi gures like Osama bin Laden try to paint the US War on Terror as a war against Islam, 
thereby evoking widespread defi ance among Muslim populations of the Middle East.  Since deterrence 
of terror requires severe sanctions against many personal freedoms, it is already likely to produce 
some defi ance eff ects. But if terror organizations like al-Qaeda can compound defi ance of anti-terror 
measures, then an escalation in deterrence power may not be worth the corresponding resulting backlash. 
If individual deterrence is not an option against terror, then law enforcement agencies must 
resort to other methods of preventing terror. Put simply, if the threat of punishment is insuffi  cient 
to deter terrorism, then the law must forcibly stop those who would attempt to perpetrate it. 
Incapacitation could take the form of imprisonment or preemptive attack on a terrorist cell. Shavell 
describes incapacitation as a broad range of actions that are totally distinct from deterrence in both 
application and eff ects (533). He points out that optimal incapacitation depends on the degree of 
harm that the crime would cause rather than the probability that the culprit will be apprehended. 
Determining the extent of incapacitation involves a utilitarian calculation of its costs compared to 
the harm prevented. Incapacitation measures can reasonably be adopted until the point at which 
enforcement entails a greater cost than non-enforcement. Unlike deterrence, incapacitation does 
not rest upon the terrorist’s responsiveness to the threat of punishment.  Th erefore, incapacitation 
can serve as a more successful method of terrorism prevention in many circumstances. 
Although incapacitation is oft en a better alternative than law enforcement deterrence, it is not the 
only alternative. Paul Robinson argues that social and moral controls are more powerful than criminal 
sanctions in eliciting compliance with societal rules (612). Robinson makes this statement with regard 
to criminal law in general, but his theory may be most salient when considering the motivations behind 
terrorism and the sanctions against it. For reasons previously mentioned, strict deterrence is uncertain to 
have a direct eff ect on the actions of a prospective terrorist. Deterrence constitutes an appeal to the self-
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interest of the would-be criminal. Th e reasons behind the act of terror, however, are most importantly 
a function of social and moral upbringing rather than a self-interested desire for personal gain. Th e 
terrorist will not comply with a societal rule against terror solely due to an appeal to his self-interest. 
No matter whether the terrorist is prepared to attack others in a foreign country or in his own country, 
he has little or no responsiveness to legal sanctions. Robinson argues that criminal law is essential to 
building moral principles, but in the cases of the IRA, ETA or al-Qaeda, terror attacks are driven by non-
mainstream political or religious ideologies that do not give credence to offi  cial laws. Only when the 
political system is universally seen as legitimate will it be able to provide moral values to the population. 
Th erefore, political legitimacy is a necessary condition for spreading a moral value against terrorism.
Whether through deterrence, incapacitation or political reform, there is not necessarily 
one correct answer to dealing with all forms of terrorism. John Braithwaite presents the notion of 
a responsive regulatory pyramid for determining the appropriate criminal justice action (6-7). 
He argues for a fl uid system of escalation from restorative justice to deterrence and fi nally to 
incapacitation depending on the responses encountered. Braithwaite focuses not on the consequential 
eff ects of each method, but rather on the appropriateness of each course of action. He believes that 
if the response is correctly suited to the stimulus, a benefi cial result will follow. Braithwaite notes 
that this hypothesis is more in line with international relations theory than with standard criminal 
justice logic, but he believes that it is a valuable tactic when dealing with a hostile terrorist entity. 
To illustrate his point, Braithwaite presents the case of US relations with the Taliban in 
Afghanistan aft er the 9/11 attacks. Although the Taliban off ered to negotiate with the US over 
Osama bin Laden, the US rejected this option and proceeded to war. Braithwaite argues that one 
must always begin with dialogue at the restorative justice stage of the pyramid before proceeding 
upward to deterrence, and certainly before undertaking a war of incapacitation (8). He notes that 
this step must be attempted even if one knows it will not succeed. Such willingness to engage in 
dialogue, he argues, may have mitigated Muslim antipathy toward the US following the invasion of 
Afghanistan. Braithwaite’s paper, which was written in 2002, shows great foresight regarding current 
US problems in the Middle East. His message concerning restorative justice as a preliminary stage 
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of regulation could have future utilitarian value in facilitating the United States’ War on Terror.
Braithwaite’s argument is subject to some challenges.  Th is argument for dialogue before 
an escalation of force appears more relevant when discussing negotiations with a foreign nation, 
and it seems to take a naïve view of terrorism. Would such a method work even when the enemy 
has no desire for discussion and is not concerned with the legal conventions of war? Braithwaite 
believes that responsive regulatory theory can compel even the otherwise irrational actor to 
respond to rational incentives (9). Th is is contrary to standard deterrence theory, which requires 
that the target of deterrence be rational and self-interested. It is unclear whether Braithwaite’s 
method can be eff ective in preventing acts of terrorism when applied to discussion with the 
individual himself, but his point may be more valid with regard to a terrorist organization. 
It is unlikely that an individual who is prepared to infl ict harm on others, and possibly on himself, 
will listen to the voice of reason, but dialogue with the larger group that commissioned the individual 
may provide insight toward averting such an attack. Although the ideology that drives the individual 
terrorist emanates from the leadership of the terrorist group, the organizational heads are less extreme 
than their espousal of violence suggests. Th e leader of a terrorist group will never put himself in a 
position of danger, but instead subjects marginal lives to the risks of capture or death. Th ese leaders 
preach the good of the mission over the life of the individual and yet never sacrifi ce their own lives. 
But in this hypocrisy lies a kernel of rationality that can be motivated by appeals to self-interest. 
It is important to think in terms of a terrorist organization because it is rare that an  individual 
would commit an act of terror without the fi nancial and moral support of a larger group. Th ere 
are those who benefi t from acts of terror and those who facilitate it. At times, these two groups 
are one and the same. Sometimes the terrorist’s family is compensated ex post facto for the 
accomplishment of the goal, and this support may be a motivating factor in the terrorist’s initial 
agreement to undertake the attack. Many terrorists are selected because they are in a position of 
fi nancial despair.  Th ese candidates might rationally choose terrorism as the best means to support 
their families. Cutting off  this pipeline could impact this rationality and have a deterrent eff ect 
on terrorism. Israel, a country that frequently deals with acts of terror, has laws that prohibit the 
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dispensing of funds to the family of a suicide bomber and that permit the demolition of property 
owned by the immediate family of a terrorist (Garoupa, Klick and Parisi 27). Such provisions seek 
not only to discourage terrorism as a means to support one’s family, but also to encourage family 
members to warn their relatives of such negative consequences. Th is broadening of the examination 
of terrorism reveals opportunities for incentives and disincentives that were not otherwise evident.
Th e other secondary group responsible for terrorism consists of the providers of weaponry and 
plans for the attacks. Th is backstage authority renders the terrorist attacker a mere puppet. While the 
terrorist sacrifi ces his life or at least his freedom in achieving his goal, the organization gives up very 
little in accomplishing its objective. Garoupa, Klick and Parisi take note of both active supporters of 
terror and those who could deter terror but do not, constituting crimes of commission and omission, 
respectively (4). Even when direct deterrence is ineff ective, secondary deterrence can play a role whenever 
there are rational motivations behind the act. Unlike the direct terrorist, the guiding organization can 
be motivated by the magnitude of sanctions, whether monetary or otherwise. Although the terrorist 
himself may have nothing to lose, those higher up in the organization enjoy many privileges that could 
be taken away. Braithwaite suggests that wealthy Saudi businessmen who may fund al-Qaeda would 
be particularly susceptible to any deterrence that threatens their material interest in global trade (26). 
Financiers of terror never sacrifi ce their own status or life in terrorist operations, so they are quite 
diff erent from the suicide bomber who shows no sensitivity to severe punishment.  However, these 
individuals are likely to alter their behavior if they too have disincentives to continue funding terrorism. 
Like many other crimes perpetrated by groups of individuals, terrorism requires a great deal 
of trust among members of an organization. One way to combat terror is to undermine the trust 
necessary for a cooperative relationship. Th is can be accomplished with the use of plea-bargaining 
and leniency agreements when dealing with captured terrorist conspirators as a means to form rift s 
within the organization (Garoupa, Klick and Parisi 14). While the intense indoctrination within 
most terrorist groups makes members more diffi  cult to turn than other criminals, even a small 
breakdown in collective trust could have a drastic eff ect on the eff ectiveness of the group. If a member 
of a terrorist unit can be subverted, this can cast suspicion on all members of the organization 
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and even undermine the trust of those who provide moral and fi nancial support to the group. 
Another important aspect of the punishment of terrorism is the determination of when liability 
can be administered. Paul Robinson examines a case of theft  to study basic human intuitions about when 
during an attempted crime liability should be signifi cant. He found that most subjects do not assign 
heavy liability until the point of “dangerous proximity,” the fi ft h of six stages toward criminal action 
when the off ense is likely to be completed successfully (Robinson 625-627). Robinson notes that this 
fi nding is consistent with the common law legal test for liability. Th e two initial stages before the crime 
is complete consist of the thought of the off ense without any action and the very basic planning stage. 
Th ere is never a penalty for simply thinking about committing a crime, but some legal systems would 
assign “inchoate liability” for a substantial degree of planning towards a criminal act (Robinson 622). 
Robinson’s study found that only 27% of respondents deemed punishment appropriate in this second 
stage leading up to the theft  (629). I wonder whether this late determination of liability would change 
for the crime of terrorism in support of strong sanctions at a much earlier stage in planning the crime. 
Support for or opposition to the USA PATRIOT Act, for example, may provide an indication of popular 
sentiments about imposing sanctions at a very early stage when there is the potential for terrorism.
A study of intuitions about terrorism should elicit a judgment of severe liability even early 
in the planning process. Because the expected harm of terrorism is much greater than the harm 
caused by theft , a high sanction should be imposed against terrorism at a much earlier stage than 
against theft . At an early stage the chance of the crime being completed is fairly low, while at the 
point of “dangerous proximity” it is a near certainty. To balance the harmful eff ects of theft  versus 
terrorism, the sanction at a given stage must be much higher for terrorism than for theft . If instead the 
sanction is held constant, then it must be imposed for terrorism at a much earlier stage of planning, 
when the probability of completion is signifi cantly lower. Th is view is a hybrid of Shavell’s separate 
arguments regarding deterrence sanctions and incapacitative sanctions. While combining the two 
may seem inconsistent from a legal perspective, it makes perfect sense from a utilitarian standpoint.
In large part, terrorism is diffi  cult to eliminate in the world today due to the unusual psychology 
inherent in a terrorist attack. Law enforcement offi  cials do not think like terrorists and may fi nd 
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it hard to understand the motives and infl uences behind an attack. Diff erent from most other 
crimes, terrorism is rarely undertaken for self-interested reasons, at least not at the individual level. 
Th erefore, a terrorist is usually a poor candidate for deterrence. Nonetheless, even though deterrence 
may not be able to dissuade the terrorist who is wholly committed to his mission, there are many 
other individuals with infl uence on the commission of terror who are responsive to legal sanctions. 
Wealthy sponsors of terror or relatives of potential terrorists would certainly be deterred by economic 
or criminal penalties. Even where deterrence fails, incapacitation is a costly but viable option. But 
beyond these basic methods, alternate strategies such as Robinson’s moral and social controls or 
Braithwaite’s responsive regulation off er new ways to stop terrorism before its motivation manifests. 
Because it causes great harm, terrorism requires steeper sanctions and earlier enforcement than other 
crimes. Even traditional methods of punishment can be adapted to suit the abnormal terrorist psyche. 
Terrorism is not an ordinary crime, so we cannot rely upon ordinary measures to curb its commission. 
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